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On a sunny afternoon on September 22, 1982, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
arrived in Beijing to begin the second leg of her two-week tour of the Far East. While, as 
Opposition Leader, Mrs. Thatcher had first set foot on mainland China in 1977,1 this was 
the first visit by a British prime minister in office to Communist China. Among the 
important issue for discussion was the future of Hong Kong, where the ninety-nine year 
lease of the New Territories by the United Kingdom would expire in 1997. When meeting 
the Chinese paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, Thatcher asserted that the three treaties 
governing Hong Kong’s status were valid and British administration should be maintained 
beyond 1997. Disagreed, Deng insisted that China would resume both sovereignty and 
administration over Hong Kong. After an “abrasive” session with the “cruel” Deng,2 
Thatcher, walking down the Great Hall steps, slipped and fell to her knees. Captured by 
television cameras, the moment of Thatcher’s slip was repeatedly shown on Hong Kong 
television that night (and thereafter).3 If Thatcher’s “fall” in Beijing suggested a declining 
Britain after the so-called “century of humiliation,” China under the reformist Deng was on 
the path to becoming an economic powerhouse by the close of the century. By 1984, after 
two years of tough negotiations with the Chinese, the “Iron Lady,” who prided herself on 
being “not for turning,” could not but agree to return Hong Kong to China in 1997.4 
 This article examines Thatcher’s visit to China in the wider context of the rise of 
“Thatcherism” in Britain, the Sino-American controversy over Taiwan, and Anglo-Chinese 
relations since full diplomatic normalisation. 1982 was not only a crucial year for the 
people of Hong Kong, but also a pivotal moment for Thatcher’s Britain and Deng’s China. 
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Coming as it did three months after victory in the Falklands War, Thatcher’s visit to China 
could hardly have been better timed. With her growing prestige at home and abroad, 
Thatcher could approach the Hong Kong question with a new confidence and in 
accordance with her principles or “Thatcherism.” On the other hand, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the British Embassy in Beijing were anxious to ensure 
that the United Kingdom should harbour a sense of realism in negotiating with China. 
Thatcher’s China visit was thus a significant event through which the impact of the 
Falklands victory on Britain’s diplomacy and place in the world could be assessed. 
 Thatcher’s China trip, moreover, occurred at a critical juncture in Sino-American 
relations as a result of the Taiwan question. In 1979 China and the United States had 
achieved full diplomatic normalisation by exchanging ambassadors. During 1982, 
however, the resumption of US arms sales to Taiwan created tension between Washington 
and Beijing. Although the US-China Joint Communiqué, signed on August 17, defused the 
crisis, Deng believed that it had not resolved the fundamental problem of Sino-American 
relations brought about by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, namely Washington’s 
continuing support for Taiwan which posed an obstacle to peaceful unification. Shortly 
after the conclusion of the communiqué, on September 1, Deng declared that China would 
pursue an “independent foreign policy.” While related to the perceived changing balance 
of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, the proclamation of China’s 
“independent foreign policy” also had to do with Deng’s nationalist concerns. Thatcher 
arrived in Beijing at a time when Deng had been, and continued to be, preoccupied with 
the question of sovereignty, be it about Taiwan or Hong Kong. Nevertheless, by the early 
1980s, Hong Kong was only one of the issues in Anglo-Chinese bilateral relations since 
diplomatic normalisation in 1972. With his reform to modernise China and her 
“revolution” to reverse Britain’s “decline,” both Deng and Thatcher attached importance to 
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Anglo-Chinese economic relations. Negotiation for Hong Kong’s future was thus set 
against the wider background of improved Anglo-Chinese relations. 
 By focusing on Thatcher’s China visit, this article not only illuminates a crucial 
episode in the colonial history of Hong Kong, but also sheds valuable light on British 
political history and Cold War international history, such as the impact of the Falklands 
War and “Thatcherism” on Britain, Sino-American relations regarding Taiwan, and 
China’s quest for national unification. Thatcher’s meetings with the Chinese leaders, 
occurring as they did in the unique circumstances of 1982, presaged the end of British 
Hong Kong. What Deng had told Thatcher – that China would resume both sovereignty 
and administration over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997 – would be written into the Sino-
British Joint Declaration, signed on December 19, 1984. The first two sections of this 
article focuses on the background and preparations for Thatcher’s visit, showing how the 
British and the Chinese developed their respective negotiating objectives and strategies. 
Section III provides a detailed account of the summit talks, highlighting how Thatcher 
sought to “educate” Deng in Hong Kong’s capitalism. In order to assess its significance, 
Section IV contextualises Thatcher’s visit by exploring domestic British politics and the 
changing dynamics of US-China-Taiwan relations, before a conclusion is drawn. 
 
I 
During the “century of humiliation,” Hong Kong became part of the British Empire in 
three stages. After China’s defeat in the First Opium War, the Treaty of Nanjing of August 
19, 1842 ceded Hong Kong Island to the United Kingdom in perpetuity. The following 
year, Hong Kong was declared a Crown Colony. The Convention of Beijing, signed on 
October 24, 1860 following the second Anglo-Chinese war, added the Kowloon Peninsula 
and the Stonecutters Island to Hong Kong. During the “scramble for concessions” in 
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China, according to the Convention of Beijing of June 9, 1898, Britain got a ninety-nine 
year lease of the New Territories and some two hundred and thirty islands, increasing 
approximately ten times the land area of the Crown Colony to 391 miles. 
 After 1949 Mao Zedong regarded the three Treaties as “unequal” and thus invalid. 
To him, China always possessed sovereignty over the whole of Hong Kong, but in view of 
the Cold War would leave the British Colony alone in accordance with the principles of 
“long-term planning and full utilisation.”5 On March 8, 1963, a Renmin Ribao editorial 
formally stated that, with regard to the questions of Hong Kong and Macao, which were “a 
legacy of the past,” China held that “when the conditions are ripe, they should be settled 
peacefully through negotiations and that, pending a settlement, the status quo should be 
maintained.”6 Deng Xiaoping, then the general secretary of the Party who had been 
handling the Sino-Soviet ideological split, had revised the editorial before its publication. 
Indeed, the editorial was aimed to counter a hostile statement of the American Communist 
Party echoing Nikita Khrushchev’s criticism, in December 1962, of China’s toleration of 
colonialism in British Hong Kong and in Portuguese Macao.7 In May 1974 Deng, who was 
then put in charge of foreign affairs among other duties, was apparently entrusted by Mao 
with the responsibility of resolving the Hong Kong question in the long term. In a meeting 
with the former British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, Mao accompanied by Deng said 
that it was not the proper time to discuss Hong Kong, a matter which would be “their 
business” (meaning the younger Deng’s).8 Such were the origins of Deng’s involvement in 
Hong Kong affairs. (Indeed, Deng’s very first encounter with Hong Kong could be traced 
back to 1920 when his ship stopped there on its way to France.)9 
 Since the 1950s successive British governments had come to realise that Hong 
Kong was militarily indefensible against a determined Chinese attack, and was 
constitutionally “awkward” with no chance of advance towards self-government and 
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independence. As a result of the leftist riots in 1967, the then Wilson government 
undertook a study of Britain’s long-term policy towards Hong Kong, which concluded in 
1969 that “Hong Kong’s future must eventually lie in China” and that “our objective must 
be to attempt to negotiate its return, at a favourable opportunity, on the best terms 
obtainable for its people and for our material interests there.”10 For much of the 1970s, 
however, such an opportunity did not arise as a result of the ongoing Cultural Revolution 
and the uncertainty of post-Mao succession politics. It was not until early 1979, when the 
reform-minded Deng had consolidated his power and business concern about the land 
leases in the New Territories began to grow, that the Callaghan government decided to 
sound the Chinese out about Hong Kong’s future. 
 At the invitation of the Chinese minister of foreign trade, Hong Kong Governor 
Murray MacLehose visited Beijing and was granted an interview with Deng on March 29. 
Taking a “sidelong approach”11 to the political question of Hong Kong’s “long term 
future,” MacLehose raised the “immediate problem of individual leases in the New 
Territories,” which would expire three days before the expiry of the New Territories Lease 
itself on July 1, 1997. He proposed that, if Deng agreed, the Hong Kong government 
would grant individual land leases going beyond 1997 by simply changing the wording of 
the leases from “valid until [28] June 1997” to “valid as long as Britain administered the 
New Territories” – a change which MacLehose stressed would not affect “China’s 
underlying position on Hong Kong.” Deng refused to give a direct reply to MacLehose’s 
suggestion, however, and instead asked the governor to tell investors to “put their hearts at 
ease.” Indeed, the vice premier had seized the initiative himself by declaring, before 
MacLehose spoke, that Hong Kong was “part of China,” and any solution to the problem 
should be based on that “prerequisite.” But Deng also reassured the British that China 
would “respect the special status of Hong Kong:” in this century and even at the beginning 
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of the next, Hong Kong would maintain its capitalist system while China practised 
socialism.12  
 After the MacLehose-Deng meeting, the British raised the Hong Kong question 
with the Chinese on a number of occasions. However, Beijing refused to be drawn on the 
issue each time due to two main reasons. The first was its priority on reunification with 
Taiwan. After the full normalisation of Sino-American relations in 1979, Deng deemed the 
international environment “favourable” to the prospect of Taiwan’s return to the 
motherland, declaring the latter as one of the three main tasks of the 1980s (the other two 
being maintenance of world peace and China’s four modernisations).13 Abandoning the 
liberation of Taiwan by military means, on September 30, 1981, Marshal Ye Jianying, the 
chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, publicly 
enunciated nine principles governing China’s reunification policy (or Ye’s “Nine Points”). 
Accordingly, Taiwan, after rejoining the mainland, would enjoy a high degree of 
autonomy, and be permitted to maintain its social and economic system and to retain its 
own army.14 As Deng, the chief architect of Taiwan policy, later explained, the Nine 
Principles delivered in Ye’s name were “in effect one country, two systems.”15        
 The other reason was that, while Beijing regarded resumption of sovereignty over 
Hong Kong as a forgone conclusion, how to achieve it and particularly to maintain Hong 
Kong’s prosperity and stability was thought to be a difficult task.16 In Hong Kong, fear of 
communism was prevalent among the older generation, many of whom were refugees from 
the mainland, and the post-war baby-boomers, who were accustomed to a capitalist 
lifestyle. As early as April 1978, Deng had established a Hong Kong and Macao Affairs 
Office under the State Council with a leading small group headed by Liao Chengzhi to 
devise China’s Hong Kong policy in the post-Cultural Revolution era. Yet he needed more 
“investigation and research” (diao yan) on how to recover Hong Kong. Shortly after the 
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announcement of Ye’s Nine Points on Taiwan, on December 15, 1981, Deng instructed 
General Secretary Hu Yaobang, Liao, and other colleagues responsible for Hong Kong to 
come up with more than two proposals for resolving the Hong Kong question within three 
months.17 In January 1982, a joint policy task force, with five members including Liao, Lu 
Ping of the Hong Kong and Macao Office, and representatives of the Hong Kong branch of 
the New China News Agency, was established. After several months of policy studies and 
visits to Hong Kong, by March 1982 Liao’s team submitted a preliminary plan for 
resolving the problem of Hong Kong to the Party Central Committee.18 On March 21, 
Deng approved the preliminary plan in principle, but wanted to seek further opinion on 
concrete proposals.19  
 Between late March and early June, Deng received twelve groups of visitors from 
Hong Kong, including business tycoons, academic leaders and newspaper executives, in 
order to spell out China’s position on resuming sovereignty in 1997 and to solicit their 
views about how to maintain prosperity and stability in Hong Kong.20 On September 16, 
Deng convened a meeting with Li Xiannian, Hu Yaobang, and Li Hou (the deputy director 
of the Hong Kong and Macao Office) and others at his residence to discuss Hong Kong’s 
current financial situation. Deng said that, during the fifteen-year transitional period, China 
should prepare for possible disturbances in Hong Kong, and, in the event of serious 
disturbances, should reconsider the timing and method of recovering Hong Kong. 
Thatcher’s forthcoming visit would be a good opportunity for China to stress its principles 
on Hong Kong and to seek British cooperation.21 
  
II 
 The idea of a Far Eastern tour by Thatcher began to crystalise in the summer of 1981. To 
the FCO, a trip to China would be a return for the 1979 visit to Britain by the then Chinese 
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Premier, Hua Guofeng.22 Lacking foreign policy experience herself and preoccupied with 
economic issues during the early years of her premiership, Thatcher respected Foreign 
Secretary Lord Carrington, with whom she enjoyed “an occasionally stormy but generally 
successful relationship.”23 Carrington helped Thatcher to get a general grasp of the Hong 
Kong problem. To him, a China visit, which would inevitably include a stop in Hong 
Kong, would be “an excellent move in the context of our relations with China and our 
international position as a whole.”24            
 In early January 1982, Humphrey Atkins, the Lord Privy Seal and Carrington’s 
number two at the FCO, visited Beijing in preparation for Thatcher’s visit. When meeting 
Atkins on the 6th, Premier Zhao Ziyang spelt out China’s general stand on Hong Kong – 
that “China would safeguard her sovereignty,” and that “the prosperity of Hong Kong 
would be maintained.” After recalling Ye’s Nine Points on Taiwan, Zhao said that there 
was as yet “no specific formula” for Hong Kong, but the problem “would not be put on the 
shelf until 1997.”25 On March 9, Carrington sent a detailed minute to Thatcher about the 
meeting: while “the Chinese have not moved on essentials,” it was encouraging that they 
“recognise the existence of the problem as well as the need for it to be solved before 
1997.” Although the Chinese had stated that they wanted to “see Hong Kong remain a free 
port and a commercial and financial centre,” Carrington did not himself believe that “they 
have yet fully grasped the ways in which confidence could be threatened or maintained.” 
He asserted: “Confidence in the Territory, particularly among investors, is likely only to be 
maintained if autonomy is guaranteed by the administration continuing on the same lines, 
ie through the British.” Aware of the legal reality that Hong Kong was partly ceded and 
partly leased, Carrington believed that Britain could “only maintain sovereign powers in 
the New Territories up to 1997” and “the rest of the Territory is not viable on its own” after 
that date. If Britain and China “could come to an arrangement whereby we made some sort 
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of recognition of Chinese sovereignty over the rest of the Territory (ie Hong Kong Island 
and Kowloon) while still retaining the right to administer the Territory beyond 1997,” it 
would represent a “real foreign policy success.”26 Thatcher, having read but making no 
comment on the substance of his minute, hoped to discuss with Carrington in the coming 
weeks.27  
 Deng used a former prime minister to convey a message to London. In early April, 
Edward Heath, a ‘friend of China’ due to his roles in Sino-British normalisation and 
opposition to Soviet hegemony, visited China for the fifth time.28 Referring to Ye’s Nine-
Point proposals for Taiwan, which he suggested could be applied to Hong Kong, Deng 
stated that the new Chinese Constitution (which would be approved by the National 
People’s Congress in December 1982) would make provision for the creation of “special 
administrative zones,” according to which Hong Kong would be permitted to keep its 
“various systems” and managed by its inhabitants including foreign residents. Under such 
an arrangement, Deng claimed, Britain “might suffer a loss of taxation revenue from Hong 
Kong,” but “trade and commerce would not suffer.”29 As the British ambassador in 
Beijing, Percy Cradock, assessed it, Deng’s was “the most important and revealing 
statement” about Hong Kong so far. Although Deng’s proposals did “not entirely preclude 
the possibility of continued British administration,” Cradock expressed his concern that 
Deng had shown “continued misunderstanding of the way the Hong Kong economy works 
and what investors will accept,” including “the delusion that the UK Treasury receives 
taxation revenue from Hong Kong.” “We must correct Chinese misconceptions,” Cradock 
recommended to London, and “try to explain to them how to avoid killing the goose that 
lays the golden eggs.”30       
 The Deng-Heath conversation came just days after Argentina had invaded the 
Falkland Islands on April 2. Although Thatcher could not devote too much time to Hong 
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Kong during what would become a seventy-two-day war,31 she nonetheless took a personal 
interest in planning her Far Eastern tour – for example, concerning the first leg of her trip, 
she had preferred to go to China first but finally chose Japan on the FCO’s advice.32 After 
some deliberations about squeezing it into her busy diary, the China visit was scheduled 
for September 22-26, followed by a two-and-half day trip to Hong Kong, and would 
feature a small party consisting of Assistant Under Secretary Alan Donald, Hong Kong 
Governor Edward Youde, and John Coles (but not the foreign secretary). According to the 
FCO, the “main objectives” of the visit were to “demonstrate Britain’s willingness to 
develop through exchanges at the top level an enduring and balanced relationship with 
China” and to “take such limited opportunities as may arise to further our commercial 
interests.” But the “dominant objective” was to “obtain further Chinese understanding and 
cooperation over Hong Kong:” specifically, to “seek agreement on the opening of 
discussions on the future of the Territory after 1997.”33 
 Thus began the project of “educating” China in Hong Kong’s capitalism. As 
Cradock advised the FCO in early 1982: “We must make every effort to educate the 
Chinese as to what the concept of ‘investor confidence’ involves.”34 The notion of 
“educating” the Chinese had a long history in the British official mind, albeit for different 
reasons over times.  Back in the nineteenth century, an expanding Victorian empire 
undertook a “pedagogical project” of indirectly influencing a declining Qing empire. 
Through various means of coercion (punitive expeditions and plunder) and enticement 
(training aid and exchange of embassies), the British imperialists aimed to teach the Qing 
court and the Chinese people about how to “behave properly” in the age of European 
empires.35 During the Cold War a century later, the balance of power between Britain and 
China in Asia had reversed; so had the aims and means of Britain’s “pedagogical project” 
changed. As the British Chargé d’Affaires in Beijing, Donald Hopson, assessed the pros 
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and cons of China’s admission to the United Unions in 1966, the issue boiled down to 
“Education of China versus Disruption of the U.N.” He concluded that “the aim of trying 
to teach China to become a more normal and co-operative member of international society 
should surely be recognised as paramount.”36 By the early 1980s, after London and Beijing 
had achieved full diplomatic normalisation, the “education” of China became a lengthy 
process of engagement, dialogue and cooperation. As far as her China visit was concerned, 
Thatcher aimed to demonstrate how Hong Kong’s capitalist system worked, to persuade 
the Chinese leaders that continuing British administration was essential to business 
confidence, and to seek agreement on the opening of formal talks on Hong Kong’s future. 
 During a meeting at Downing Street on July 28, Thatcher, following the lines of 
argument made previously by Carrington (who had resigned over the Falklands War), 
asserted that “there appeared to be a fundamental lack of comprehension on the Chinese 
side as to what was needed to maintain confidence in Hong Kong,” and the proposals they 
had so far put forward “would in themselves bring about a collapse of confidence.” 
Governor Youde noted that while the unofficial members of Hong Kong’s Executive and 
Legislative Councils (UMELCO) “wished British administration to continue,” they 
believed that this could not be achieved “unless we were prepared to concede sovereignty” 
over the whole of Hong Kong. In this vein, Thatcher suggested the idea of a “management 
contract” – a device which would leave the administration of Hong Kong in British hands, 
while allowing China to claim that it had recovered sovereignty. But she stressed that “we 
should not start by assuming that we shall have to give up sovereignty.” 
 Significantly, the Hong Kong question was bound up with the sensitive issue of 
British nationality and immigration. To Thatcher, “citizenship was linked to sovereignty:” 
if sovereignty were transferred to China, the inhabitants of Hong Kong could no longer 
have British passports, and they ought to be made aware of this at some stage. Related to 
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this, Thatcher believed that “the presentation in the United Kingdom of any concession 
would need the utmost care:” it was essential to show that there was “no danger of a mass 
influx of Hong Kong citizens” to the United Kingdom as a result of any agreement. Thus, 
“[e]ndorsement of any agreement by the people of Hong Kong” would “be of great 
assistance in presenting it in the United Kingdom.” In this aspect, Youde suggested to 
invite UMELCO to London for consultation.37 
 After the Downing Street meeting, the Foreign Office constituted a special group 
under Lord Belstead, the minister of state responsible inter alia for Asian affairs, with the 
aim of producing a full study of all aspects of the Hong Kong problem.38 Completed in late 
August, the study, titled “The Future of Hong Kong: A Special Study,” was the result of 
extensive consultation with the ambassador in Beijing, the Hong Kong governor, and a 
number of departments, although the recommendations were the responsibility of the FCO 
alone.39 In a minute to Thatcher on September 3, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym 
summarised the conclusions of the study. After examining a number of options, the study 
concluded that “the likeliest way of reconciling our position and that of the Chinese while 
meeting the interests of the people of Hong Kong as a whole would be some form of 
‘management contract’.” Any such arrangement should provide “very firm guarantees for 
the continuation of British administration beyond 1997,” and only “on that basis could any 
acknowledgement of Chinese sovereignty be considered.” With the immigration issue in 
his mind, Pym argued that a “management contract” would “be saleable in this country 
both in Parliament and to public opinion,” and, by maintaining confidence in Hong Kong’s 
future, would “discourage people in Hong Kong from trying to leave and come to this 
country.”40   
 Thatcher was eager to gauge the “climate of opinion” in Hong Kong, where she felt 
Britain had a moral obligation to its people. On September 8, she invited the Hong Kong 
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governor and five UMELCO to lunch in Downing Street. Having a disposition to 
“suddenly propose something dramatic and impractical”41 in policy deliberations, Thatcher 
asked whether those present would welcome “independence” if it were a “genuine option” 
for Hong Kong. Lydia Dunn, a member of both Councils and an executive with John Swire 
and Sons Ltd., replied that “independence,” if feasible, would be “preferable to absorption 
of China,” although “the wish of the people of Hong Kong” would be maintenance of the 
British system. Sir Sze-yuen Chung, Senior Unofficial Member of the Executive Council 
and a successful industrialist, said that it was widely believed that China would not allow 
Hong Kong to become independent. Thatcher then floated the idea of continuing British 
administration “in exchange for a sovereignty which was merely titular.” Dunn replied that 
“at first blush the Chinese might regard titular sovereignty as inadequate,” but they were 
“pragmatic” and might be reconciled to the British standpoint “[o]nce they had been 
educated to see that prosperity flowed from British administration.” Sceptical about their 
“pragmatic” character, Thatcher claimed that the Chinese were “Marxist” and their system 
was “centralist,” and that the Chinese “did not understand what was necessary to maintain 
confidence.” After she had been told that some Hong Kong businessmen had been invited 
to Beijing for consultation, Thatcher commented that it was “not certain” that these people 
had “stated their views clearly” to the Chinese leaders. On the issue of China’s “basic 
misunderstanding” of the economic system in Hong Kong, Thatcher asked whether the 
“Special Economic Zones” in mainland China were relevant. She was told that the zones 
were “not successful,” and the conditions there “chaotic.” At the end of the meeting, 
Thatcher reassured her guests that Britain’s “duty lay with the five and a half million 
people of Hong Kong.”42  
 To seek cabinet endorsement of her negotiating approach, Thatcher chaired a small 
ministerial meeting on September 13. Expressing her reluctance to discuss “substantive 
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concessions on sovereignty” with the Chinese leaders, Thatcher declared that “[t]he most 
she was prepared to envisage was that China would obtain merely titular sovereignty over 
Hong Kong.” The attorney general, Michael Havers, commented that “any arrangement 
involving the cession of sovereignty would require legislation,” adding that there “might 
also have to be legislation on immigration.” The home secretary, William Whitelaw, 
pointed out that under the 1981 Nationality Act (where Hong Kong was assigned the status 
of British Dependent Territories Citizenship), the bulk of the Hong Kong population had 
“no automatic right of abode in the United Kingdom.” But the British government might 
still face a difficult situation “if large numbers simply arrived on our shores,” he warned. 
Thus, “[t]he prospect of a major problem of immigration was a strong reason for arriving at 
a satisfactory agreement on the future of the colony.”43  
 A briefing meeting for Thatcher was held on September 14, two days before she set 
off for Japan. The programme for her China trip was finalised only the day before she 
arrived in Beijing.44 Nevertheless, the overall aim of the visit remained unchanged: to 
“educate” the Chinese leaders about the importance of continuing British administration in 
Hong Kong after 1997. 
 
III 
Arriving by VC10 in the early afternoon of September 22, Thatcher’s party was greeted at 
Beijing Airport by Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin, and was then driven to the State 
Guest House. A formal welcoming ceremony was arranged outside the Great Hall of the 
People, where Thatcher inspected a guard of honour. There followed the first round of 
talks between Premier Zhao Ziyang and Thatcher, focusing on China’s relations with the 
superpowers.45 At night, a welcoming banquet in the prime minister’s honour was given by 
Zhao in the Great Hall for some two hundred guests. In her speech, Thatcher talked of the 
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long history of Anglo-Chinese “friendship,” quoting a Tang poem to illustrate that 
“[geographical] distances mean very little” to “friendship.”46 Before the start of the talks 
on Hong Kong the next day, however, Zhao resorted to “megaphone diplomacy” to exert 
pressure on the British. In answering questions put to him by Hong Kong reporters, Zhao 
revealed that China would of course resume sovereignty over Hong Kong, although adding 
that this would not affect Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity.47 
 At the Great Hall of the People, Thatcher opened the meeting with a statement 
conveying the crucial message about how capitalist Hong Kong worked. “Hong Kong is a 
unique example of successful Sino/British co-operation,” Thatcher proclaimed, and the 
problem faced by Britain and China at the moment was “how to agree about its future 
while maintaining its prosperity.” To Thatcher, “the prosperity of Hong Kong depends on 
confidence,” which in turn depended not only on “good relations between Britain and 
China” but also on other things – “a stable and internationally respected currency;” “a 
financial and tax regime favouring business enterprise and which is not liable to sudden 
change” (and one from which “Britain derives no revenue”); “a formal and internationally 
respected system of law;” “the maintenance of public order;” and “the freedom of its 
political and economic system.” Referring to the “general assurances” given previously by 
Deng and Zhao that “the present local systems will be preserved” and that “Hong Kong 
must be maintained as an international centre,” Thatcher asserted that they would “not be 
enough by themselves to maintain confidence.” Rather, she reiterated that “[c]onfidence in 
Hong Kong, and thus its continued prosperity, depend on British administration.”     
 On the “delicate” issue of sovereignty, Thatcher said that the Chinese position was 
“well-known” to the British government, but it was “politically difficult” for her to agree 
to China’s assertion of sovereignty over Hong Kong: acceptance of this “would involve 
Britain abrogating by Act of Parliament the treaties under which the British administer 
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Hong Kong.” Besides, abrogation of the treaties by Beijing alone would “produce 
immediate panic in Hong Kong,” and would be “rejected by the British Government and 
Parliament and by the people of Hong Kong.” 
 After listening very carefully to Thatcher’s statement, Zhao said that the Hong 
Kong question was “an issue left over from history,” and that the time had come when 
China would “recover its sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997 – and no later.” Claiming 
that China “was not bound by treaties signed between the British Government and the 
Ching dynasty,” Zhao asserted that the recovery of the whole of Hong Kong (Hong Kong 
Island and Kowloon being “inseparable” from the New Territories) was “an issue 
concerning Chinese sovereignty, territorial integrity and the national feelings of the 
Chinese people.” After the recovery of sovereignty, China would pursue “special policies” 
in Hong Kong, “designed to maintain stability and prosperity;” for example, Hong Kong 
could become “a special administrative zone administered by local people,” “its existing 
economic and social system and style of life” could remain unchanged, and “its function as 
an international financial centre” would continue. If “it came to a choice between the two,” 
Zhao said, “China would put sovereignty above prosperity and stability” because 
“[s]overeignty was a matter of principle.” Zhao did not think that it was “impossible” to 
maintain the confidence of investors during the transitional period as long as both sides 
“showed full co-operation.” If China pursued a policy of maintaining prosperity in Hong 
Kong, Zhao was optimistic that Chinese investors would stay, asking rhetorically where 
else they could go. Thatcher, seizing an opportunity to “educate” the Chinese premier who 
was apparently ignorant of global capitalism, immediately suggested Singapore, the 
Philippines, or even New York. 
 Besides the confidence factor, Thatcher underscored the legality of the three 
Treaties governing Hong Kong’s status. By 1997 “the legal basis for the British 
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Administration of the new territories would end: the British Government honoured its 
agreements.” Yet “the legal basis for British retention of Hong Kong and Kowloon would 
continue as a matter of international law.” Although the Chinese wanted these treaties to be 
abrogated, Thatcher hoped that they would “recognise that abrogation would have to be 
achieved through a law passed by the British Parliament.” If Beijing insisted on abrogating 
one agreement “valid at international law,” “what assurance could there be that they would 
keep any other agreement,” she wondered.48  
 The third day in Beijing, September 24, Thatcher was received by Deng Xiaoping. 
Arguing that the British and Chinese governments shared the “common objective” of 
“maintaining the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong in the interests of the people who 
lived there,” Thatcher spelt out her position on the resolution of the 1997 question. If the 
two governments could agree “definite arrangements about the future administration and 
control of Hong Kong,” and if she were satisfied that they would work and “command 
confidence” in the British Parliament and among the people of Hong Kong, Thatcher could 
“consider the question of sovereignty” and recommend the outcome to Parliament 
accordingly. As there was “no time in the present short visit to reconcile the differences” 
over Hong Kong, Thatcher proposed that, before she left Beijing, both sides should 
announce that further talks would take place. 
 Deng, for his part, underscored the Chinese basic position on Hong Kong in three 
aspects – sovereignty, prosperity, and the question of how to “avoid turbulence” in Hong 
Kong between now and 1997. First and foremost, “sovereignty was not a matter which 
could be discussed:” “in 1997 China would certainly recover sovereignty over Hong 
Kong.” If Hong Kong were not returned to the motherland in 1997, Deng warned, the 
Chinese government “would not be able to account for it to the Chinese people,” who 
would think that “the new China was like the China of the Ching dynasty and the present 
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leaders were like Li Hongzhang.” Significantly, Deng revealed that in “no more than one 
or two years time,” the Chinese government “would formally announce their decision to 
recover Hong Kong.” He had postponed the announcement because China needed time to 
solicit widespread views from various circles in Hong Kong and to conduct “friendly 
consultations” with Britain. Referring to Thatcher’s remarks about her “difficulties” over 
sovereignty, Deng offered his personal view that China’s recovery of Hong Kong would 
“bring a much bigger benefit because it meant that the period of colonialism would have 
ended in Britain.”  
 Unimpressed by Deng’s comments on the nature of British colonialism, Thatcher 
replied that it was Britain’s “normal policy” to bring former colonies to independence (45 
members of the United Nations fell into that category), but that Hong Kong was 
exceptional “because of the complications of the lease from China.” Yet she took pains to 
highlight that “the British Government derived no revenue from Hong Kong, and Hong 
Kong received no aid.” “Britain was not a colonialist country: we had moved beyond that,” 
she claimed. Rather, “Britain simply wanted to carry out her moral duty to Hong Kong.” 
Regarding the attitude of the Hong Kong people, Thatcher later added that “every survey” 
showed that they “wished the British system of administration to be maintained.” 
  On the question of maintaining prosperity and stability, Deng said that China 
“hoped to enjoy the co-operation of Britain,” but that “did not mean that the prosperity of 
Hong Kong could be maintained only under British administration.” If there were “very 
large and serious disturbances” in the next fifteen years, Deng warned, “the Chinese 
Government would be forced to consider the time and formula relating to the recovery of 
its sovereignty over Hong Kong.” He added that any “major disturbances” “would be man-
made (artificial), not natural.” When queried by Thatcher that “all disturbances were 
created by man,” Deng clarified that the disturbances “would be created, not by 
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Governments, but by individuals, some Chinese, some British.” He cited the example of 
the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank: “No-one knew how many banknotes it had issued.” 
Just as Thatcher had enlightened Zhao on global capitalism the previous day, Youde 
immediately corrected Deng by saying that the colonial authorities knew. Deng agreed, but 
insisted that the Hong Kong people he talked to did not know. To Deng, the British and 
Chinese governments should “prevent some businessmen from doing things which were 
detrimental to the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong.” 
 Towards the end of the meeting, Deng suggested that the two sides should agree to 
start discussions through diplomatic channels on the “pre-condition” that “in 1997 China 
would recover sovereignty over Hong Kong.” After some discussion, the two sides agreed 
to issue the following statement: 
Today the leaders of both countries held far reaching talks in a friendly atmosphere 
on the future of Hong Kong. Both leaders made clear their respective positions on 
this subject. They agreed to enter talks through diplomatic channels following the 
visit with the common aim of maintaining the stability and prosperity of Hong 
Kong.49 
 Besides the Hong Kong question, Thatcher, travelling from Beijing to Shanghai 
and finally Guangzhou, discussed with the Chinese bilateral economic relations, especially 
in the fields of energy resources, transport and communications, and aviation.50    
 Upon arrival in Hong Kong on September 26, Thatcher gave a brief rundown on 
the Beijing talks to the governor and his senior officials.51 When meeting some thirty 
UMELCO the following day, Thatcher expressed her frustration with the perceived 
Chinese ignorance of capitalism. The Chinese “thought they could run a capitalist society 
but they did not know what it meant;” they “could grasp intellectually such concepts as the 
rule of law but they did not understand or accept that there could be fundamental rights that 
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did not derive from the State.” Thatcher explained that Deng’s “pragmatism counted for 
little compared with his Marxist-Leninism.” Another problem was that the Chinese leaders 
had not heard “the truth about what made Hong Kong a success from local personalities 
who had been invited to Peking.” Thatcher thus requested for the help of the unofficial 
members in getting across the basic message that Hong Kong’s prosperity depended on 
British administration.52 In other words, Deng needed to be “educated” about the real 
nature of capitalism in Hong Kong. 
 Back in the United Kingdom, on September 30, Thatcher reported to the Cabinet on 
her China visit. She said that her talks with the Chinese leaders, “although tough, had not 
been acrimonious,” and expressed her hope that the joint statement, which stipulated the 
beginning of talks through diplomatic channels, “would be sufficient to sustain confidence 
for the moment.” To Thatcher, the talks ahead would be “difficult,” but on balance, “an 
accommodation should be achievable.”53 Cradock, too, believed that the visit had achieved 
its immediate objective, and that Britain “would have a chance of instructing the Chinese 
in the economic realities of Hong Kong” in future negotiation.54 
 
IV 
To fully grasp the significance of Thatcher’s China visit, one must place it within the wider 
context of Thatcher’s Britain and Deng’s China in 1982. The Falklands War was the 
backdrop for the Thatcher government’s deliberations about Hong Kong’s future. Through 
her strong personality, the “Iron Lady” had stood up against the “defeatism” of the FCO. 
The recapture of the Falkland Islands was not only a military victory for Britain, but also a 
significant boost to Thatcher’s position within the Conservative Party and across the 
country. The Falklands conflict, however, had little long-term significance for Britain’s 
international status and post-imperial identity.55 As Robin Harris (who drafted Thatcher’s 
21 
 
memoirs) argued, the Falklands War “had changed her” and “Britain’s standing,” but 
“could not change the realities of global power.”56 The Falklands victory did not make 
Thatcher more “imperial” and more war-prone. With little overseas travel in her youth and 
no work experiences with the Empire before 1979, Thatcher was “almost uniquely insular 
and ‘a-imperial’ in her social and intellectual formation.”57 Although feeling proud of the 
history of the Empire, Thatcher was not nostalgic about the loss of imperial grandeur: she 
was “not a Monday Club Tory, opposed to decolonization as such.” 58  She was herself 
“well aware” that Hong Kong was not the Falkland Islands and China was not Argentina, 
“both from the military and the legal viewpoints.”59 Notwithstanding the Falklands 
euphoria, a military solution to the Hong Kong problem was never on the table. In other 
words, pragmatism and negotiation, not dogmatism and confrontation, characterised 
Thatcher’s approach to the Hong Kong question.60  
 Nevertheless, there were two sides of Mrs Thatcher’s personality – “the realistic 
Prime Minister” and “the emotional Margaret Thatcher.”61 During 1982, Thatcher was 
more “emotional” than “realistic:” she was not prepared to concede sovereignty to China, 
and, even in return for the retention of British administration after 1997, she was willing to 
acknowledge merely China’s “titular sovereignty” over Hong Kong. Likewise, in 1982 the 
pragmatism of the FCO did not mean the advocacy of “appeasement.” Rather, Carrington 
and later Pym, in their minutes to Thatcher, had advised against making premature 
concession without firm Chinese guarantees for Hong Kong.  
 Thatcher’s attitude towards Hong Kong’s future and, for that matter, China could 
not be isolated from the context of the rise of “Thatcherism” in Britain. Thatcher came to 
power amidst the threat of socialism (or “democratic socialism,” not communism) and the 
ensuing crisis of confidence in late 1970s Britain. She saw the defeat of the Labour Party at 
the polls, and of the influence of socialism in the society at large, not only in political 
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terms but also as a kind of moral crusade. “Thatcherism” – a set of values and principles 
that championed free market, low government spending, tax cuts, privatisation, and weak 
organised labour – thus emerged to supersede the policies of the previous Labour 
governments characterised by state involvement in the economy, high taxation and union 
militancy, among other features.62 Thatcher’s attitude towards Communist China was 
complicated. While seeing China not as a military threat but as an Asian power with a long 
civilisation which was there to stay, the Iron Lady had a “visceral dislike” of the Chinese 
system.63 To Thatcher, Deng was a “Marxist” presiding over a “centralist” polity and 
economy rather than a “pragmatist” as some had claimed, and had little understanding of 
how capitalism really worked in Hong Kong. Her perception was vindicated when Deng 
asked the British to prevent investors from withdrawing capital from Hong Kong, assumed 
that London derived tax revenue from Hong Kong, and suggested that no one knew the 
amount of banknotes issued by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. Likewise, the “Special 
Economic Zones” on the mainland were “not successful” and “chaotic,” as Thatcher was 
told.64 
 Just as she disliked the “centralist” system in China, Thatcher was proud of the 
achievement of capitalist Hong Kong, which demonstrated many features of 
“Thatcherism:” a free market economy (with selective government’s interference), fiscal 
conservatism (with no or minimal external debt), low tax rate (which was conducive to 
investment), the rule of law (which guaranteed personal freedom if not democracy), and 
weak union power (which ensured few industrial conflicts).65 Not just Thatcher, but 
Carrington, Pym and Cradock all agreed that only British administration and law, not 
Chinese communist rule, could maintain confidence in Hong Kong. 
 With Deng’s misunderstanding of capitalism being exposed in front of her in 
Beijing, Thatcher argued that the Chinese “would need to be educated slowly and 
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thoroughly in how it worked if they were to keep Hong Kong prosperous and stable.”66 In 
response to Thatcher’s request for advice, in early October the FCO submitted a note 
suggesting a number of ways to “educate further the Chinese in the realities of Hong 
Kong.” The key point should not be that “the British have expertise in administration 
which the Chinese lack,” for the Chinese leaders had hinted that after 1997 “the bulk of 
administration could be left to Hong Kong people to run.” Rather, what should be 
emphasised was that “the British connection” was valued as “an insurance against 
interference from Peking on major domestic and external issues.” The FCO realised that 
this would be “a very difficult message to get across both frankly and without causing 
offence.”67 
The FCO was right. If Deng had demonstrated a limited understanding of 
capitalism in Hong Kong, the “emotional Margaret Thatcher” had underestimated the force 
of Chinese nationalism (as invoked by Deng) in the circumstances of 1982. As Deng 
confided his difficulties to Thatcher, the Chinese people would not permit him to become 
another “Li Hongzhang.” In essence, the Deng-Thatcher meeting took place at the critical 
historical junctures of Sino-American disagreement over Taiwan and of China’s 
determination to uphold its sovereignty and “independence.” Since late 1981 the Taiwan 
question had re-emerged as the main irritant in Sino-American relations, thanks to the 
Ronald Reagan administration’s inclination to increase arms sales, including the sale of an 
advanced fighter called the FX, to Taiwan. In October Premier Zhao raised the issue with 
President Reagan, demanding that Washington should pledge not to exceed, in both quality 
and quantity, the level of arms sales under the Carter administration, agree to gradually 
reduce arms sales, and set a timetable for their complete termination. Notwithstanding 
Zhao’s reassurances that Taiwan would enjoy substantial autonomy under China’s 
sovereignty (thus making US arms sales to Taiwan both unnecessary and inappropriate), 
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Reagan wanted Beijing to make a statement on renunciation of forces against Taiwan if 
further arms sales were to be stopped.68 
The question of US arms sales to Taiwan, as Deng told Heath in April 1982, was 
“not just a matter of selling weapons” but also a “fundamental manifestation of US policy 
towards China.” Unless the United States fulfilled its obligations to gradually reduce arms 
sales until their complete termination, it was “impossible for China to resolve the Taiwan 
question peacefully.”69 Not until August 17 did Washington and Beijing sign a joint 
communiqué on US arms sales to Taiwan. While refusing to commit to a firm timetable, 
the Reagan administration agreed that it would “reduce gradually its sales of arms to 
Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution.”70 Although the communiqué 
“has broken the deadlock between the two countries,” the People’s Daily warned, “this 
does not mean that the problem has been completely solved…[T]he fundamental obstacle 
to the development of Sino-American relations is the U.S. ‘Taiwan Relations Act’.”71 
 Deng’s nationalist sensitivities were, moreover, demonstrated in his proclamation 
of China’s “independent foreign policy.” In the light of the perceived changing strategic 
balance between the Soviet Union and the United States in the latter’s favour, Deng 
wanted to shift China’s foreign policy from an overt tilt towards America since 1979 to an 
equal distance approach towards the two superpowers. But Deng was also motivated by 
nationalist concerns. When formally enunciating China’s “independent foreign policy” at 
the Twelfth Party Congress on September 1, Deng talked at great length the fundamental 
principle of “independence and self-reliance.” “While the Chinese people value their 
friendship and cooperation with other countries and other peoples, they value even more 
their hard-won independence and sovereign rights.” “We shall unswervingly follow a 
policy of opening to the outside world,” Deng continued, but the government should 
ensure that “[w]e, the Chinese people, have our national self-respect and pride.” Deng 
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identified “three major tasks” of China during the 1980s, namely “to accelerate socialist 
modernization, to strive for China’s reunification…and to oppose hegemonism and work to 
safeguard world peace.”72 
 Thatcher arrived in Beijing three weeks after the proclamation of China’s 
“independent foreign policy,” and a little over a month after the (temporary) resolution of 
Sino-American conflict over arms sales to Taiwan. With his nationalist feelings stirred by 
the Americans of late, Deng unsurprisingly refused to give an inch on the resumption of 
China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong. As reunification with Taiwan now appeared to be a 
more distant task, the recovery of Hong Kong became all the more important in Deng’s 
eyes. The evolving “one country, two systems” model, originally designed for Taiwan, 




To conclude, Thatcher’s China visit took place at the critical historical junctures of the rise 
of “Thatcherism” in post-Falklands Britain and of the growth of Deng’s nationalist 
sensitivities in view of the perceived changing international strategic balance. After the 
Falklands victory, Thatcher became a dominant political figure at home, and intensified the 
economic and social transformation of Britain in “Thatcherite” images. Externally, the 
Falklands War did not make Thatcher more nostalgic about the glory days of the British 
Empire (she still felt that Britain’s responsibility was to prepare the remaining colonies for 
self-government/independence); nor did it make her more inclined to use force as an 
instrument of British foreign policy (she continued to rely on diplomacy and the talents of 
individual diplomats such as Cradock).73 In preparing for her China visit, Thatcher had 
consulted the likes of Carringdon, Cradock, and UMELCO. All agreed that Britain should 
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not compromise on the issue of sovereignty, and only with Beijing’s “very firm 
guarantees” for the continuation of British administration beyond 1997 would Britain 
consider recognising China’s “titular sovereignty” over Hong Kong. Such a “management 
contract,” as Thatcher called it, would not only reassure the Hong Kong people, but also be 
“saleable” in the British Parliament, thus avoiding the possible influx of Hong Kong 
Chinese to Britain (even though Hong Kong holders of BDTC passports indeed enjoyed no 
automatic right of abode there). In Beijing, Thatcher aimed at “educating” the Chinese 
leaders about the fundamental fact that Hong Kong’s prosperity depended on confidence, 
which in turn rested on continuing British administration. This was not merely a 
negotiating tactic, but also a reflection of Thatcher’s strong belief in capitalism and dislike 
of socialism.  
 Nevertheless, in Deng, Thatcher found a tough and rigid negotiating partner, whose 
nationalist sensitivities had lately been roused by the Reagan administration with its arms 
sales to Taiwan (which posed an obstacle to China’s peaceful reunification efforts) and its 
massive military-up (which tilted the international strategic balance against the Soviet 
Union). As reunification with Taiwan now appeared to be a more difficult task than he 
might have expected in 1979, the recovery of Hong Kong assumed added importance in 
Deng’s eyes. The evolving “one country, two systems” model was thus applied to Hong 
Kong first, which hopefully would set a successful precedent for peaceful reunification. 
When meeting Thatcher, Deng uttered a fundamental principle: “sovereignty was not a 
matter for discussion.” Although Thatcher came away from Beijing feeling satisfied that 
the “dominant objective” of opening talks over Hong Kong’s future had been achieved, the 
project of “educating” Deng in capitalism was doomed to failure from the start. From a 
broader international history perspective, Thatcher’s China visit confirmed the decline of 
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Britain as a world power despite the Falklands victory, and the gradual rise of China as an 
economic superpower in the age of reform. 
 In retrospect, it seemed that the best way for the British to “educate” the Chinese in 
capitalism was what Deng called “seeking truth from facts.” Since the establishment of the 
four “Special Economic Zones” in 1979, Hong Kong Chinese businessmen, taking full 
advantage of the availability of a cheap labour force and special tax and tariff incentives, 
gradually moved their industrial processing/assembling operations to the mainland.74 The 
large British firms, too, were eager to strengthen Anglo-Chinese economic cooperation – 
for example, the General Electric Company’s interest in building the conventional island 
for the Guangdong Nuclear Project; the British Petroleum’s involvement in offshore oil 
exploration in the South China Sea; and the Cable and Wireless Company’s efforts to forge 
telecommunications link between Hong Kong and Guangdong Province. Rather than being 
“lectured” by the British diplomats in the Hong Kong talks, the Chinese Communists were 
keen to learn capitalism through “practice.”  
28 
 
                   
                                                 
1 Margaret Thatcher, The Path to Power (London: Harper Press, 2011), 388-91. 
2 Percy Cradock, Experiences of China (London: John Murray, 1994), 179. 
3 To save Thatcher’s “face,” the mainland Chinese media was ordered not to show the 
footage of her slip. Zhang Chunsheng and Xu Yu, eds., Zhou Nan jiemi GangAo huigui – 
ZhongYing ji ZhongPu tanpan taiqian muhou [Zhou Nan’s Leaks about the Return of 
Hong Kong and Macao to their Motherland – Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Talks and 
their Background] (Xianggang: Zhonghua chubanshe, 2012), 123-24.   
4 On Sino-British negotiations over Hong Kong between 1979 and 1984, see Cradock, 
Experiences of China; Robert Cottrell, The End of Hong Kong: The Secret Diplomacy of 
Imperial Retreat (London: John Murray, 1993); Mark Roberti, The Fall of Hong Kong: 
China’s Triumph and Britain’s Betrayal (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996); 
Steve Tsang, Hong Kong: An Appointment with China (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997); Qi 
Pengfei, Deng Xiaoping yu Xianggang huigui [Deng Xiaoping and the Return of Hong 
Kong] (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 2004); and Chen Dunde, Xianggang wenti tanpan 
shimo [Negotiations for the Hong Kong Question From Beginning to End] (Hong Kong: 
Chung Hwa Book (HK) Company, 2009). Also see the memoirs of former Chinese 
officials dealing with Hong Kong quoted later. 
5 Jin Yaoru. Zhonggong Xianggang zhengce miwen shilu [A Secret Record of the Chinese 
Communist Party’s Hong Kong Policy] (Xianggang: Tianyuan shuwu, 1998), 2-6; Nan 
Shan and Nan Zhu, Zhou Enlai shangping [The Life of Zhou Enlai] (Changchun: Jilin 
renmin chubanshe, 1997), 812-14. 
6 “A Comment on The Statement of The Communist Party of the U.S.A.,” Renmin Ribao 
Editorial, March 8, 1963 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1963), 13. 
29 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
7 Cui Qi, Wo suo qinli de ZhongSu dalunzhan [My Experience of the Sino-Soviet Great 
Polemics] (Beijing: Renmin ribao chubanshe, 2009), 145-48. 
8 Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong Manuscripts since the Founding of the 
People’s Republic of China], vol. 13 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1998), 390. 
9 Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2011), 490. 
10 Memorandum by Stewart for Ministerial Committee on Hong Kong, K (69)1, “Hong 
Kong: Long Term Study,” March 28, 1969, CAB 134/2945, The National Archives 
(hereafter TNA), Kew, Surrey, United Kingdom; Chi-kwan Mark, “Development without 
Decolonisation? Hong Kong’s Future and Relations with Britain and China, 1967-1972,” 
The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 24, no. 2 (2014): 315-35. 
11 Cradock, Experiences of China, 168. 
12 Beijing to FCO, nos. 345 and 346, March 30, 1979, FCO 21/1735 FEH021/1 Part B, 
TNA; Qi, Deng Xiaoping yu Xianggang huigui, 60-63. 
13 Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping], vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin 
chubanshe, 1994), 185-188, 239-73.    
14 Zhonggong renmin jiefangjun junshi kexueyuan, ed., Ye Jianying nianpu, 1897-1986 
[The Chronicle of Ye Jianying, 1897-1986], vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian 
chubanshe, 2007), 1200-1202. 
15 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Deng Xiaoping nianpu, 1975-1997 [The 
Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-1997], vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 
2004), 797. As early as November 1978, Deng had talked of the concept of “one country, 
two systems” in its embryonic form. See Deng Xiaoping nianpu, 1975-1997, vol. 1, 442; 
Cheng Linsheng, Deng Xiaoping ‘Yiguo liangzhi’ sixiang yanjiu [A Study of Deng 
30 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Xiaoping’s Thinking on “One Country, Two Systems”] (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin 
chubanshe, 1992), 142-43.  
16 Wong Man Fong, China’s Resumption of Sovereignty over Hong Kong (Hong Kong: 
The David C. Lam Institute for East-West Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University, 1997), 
12, 27. 
17 Deng Xiaoping nianpu, vol. 2, 791; Qi, Deng Xiaoping yu Xianggang huigui, 250. 
18 Lu Ping (with the collaboration of Qian Yijiao), Lu Ping koushu Xianggang huigui [Lu 
Ping Speaks on the Return of Hong Kong] (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing (HK) Co. Ltd., 
2009), 17-21; Wong, China’s Resumption of Sovereignty over Hong Kong, 17-19. The 
preliminary plan suggested that Hong Kong’s capitalist system and free port status should 
be maintained. 
19 Deng Xiaoping nianpu, vol. 2, 805; Lu, Lu Ping koushu Xianggang huigui, 17. 
20 Wong, China’s Resumption of Sovereignty over Hong Kong, 22-3; Qi, Deng Xiaoping yu 
Xianggang huigui, 77-78.  
21 Li Hou, Huigui de lichen (The Journey of Retrocession) (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing 
(HK) Co. Ltd., 1997), 88; Deng Xiaoping nianpu, vol. 2, 849; Chen, Xianggang wenti 
tanpan shimo, 94-98. 
22 Lyne to Alexander, July 9, 1981, Margaret Thatcher Foundation (hereafter MTF), 
document no. 122659 (http://www.margaretthatcher.org); Minute, Alexander to Lyne, July 
13, 1981, ibid. 
23 Jonathan Aitken, Margaret Thatcher: Power and Responsibility (London: Bloomsbury, 
2013), 283, 287. 
24 Minute, Carrington to Thatcher, December 15, 1981, MTF, Document no. 122661. 
25 Beijing to FCO, no. 18, January 8, 1982, PREM 19/789 Part 1, TNA. 
26 Minute, Carrington to Thatcher, March 9, 1982, PREM 19/789 Part 1, TNA. 
31 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
27 Minute, Coles to Holmes, March 15, 1982, PREM 19/789 Part 1, TNA. 
28 Deng Xiaoping ji waiguo shounao huitan lu [A Record of Deng Xiaoping’s Meetings 
with Foreign Heads] (Beijing: Taihai chubanshe, 2011), 93-99. 
29 Beijing to FCO, no. 202, April 6, 1982, PREM 19/789 Part 1, TNA; Deng Xiaoping 
nianpu, vol. 2, 812-13. 
30 Beijing to FCO, no. 209, April 7, 1982, PREM 19/789 Part 1, TNA. 
31 Fall to Coles, July 21, 1982, PREM 19/789 Part 1, TNA. 
32 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 
1993), 495-97. 
33Acland to Armstrong, July 7, 1982, PREM 19/788, TNA. 
34 Beijing to FCO, no. 22, January 12, 1982, PREM 19/789 Part 1, TNA. 
35 James L. Hevia, English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century 
China (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). 
36 Hopson to de la Mare, January 31, 1966, FO 371/187052 FC2251/4, TNA. 
37 Note of meeting, July 28, 1982, PREM 19/789 Part 1, TNA. 
38 Minute, Coles to Thatcher, July 29, 1982, PREM 19/789 Part 1, TNA. 
39 See “The Future of Hong Kong: A Special Study” by FCO, August 1982, PREM 19/792, 
TNA.   
40 Minute, Pym to Thatcher, September 3, 1982, PREM 19/789 Part 1; Minute, Coles to 
Thatcher, September 6, 1982, ibid. 
41 Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, vol. 1, Not for Turning 
(London: Allen Lane, 2013), 681. 
42 Holmes to Coles, September 6, 1982, PREM 19/789 Part 1; Record of discussion, 
September 8, 1982, enclosed in Minute, Coles to Holmes, September 8, 1982, PREM 
19/790 Part 2, TNA.  
32 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
43 Minute, Coles to Holmes, September 13, 1982, PREM 19/790 Part 2, TNA.  
44 A dossier of briefing materials on China and Hong Kong can be found in CAB 133/528; 
PREM 19/792 Part 2, TNA.  
45 See Note of meeting, September 22, 1982, PREM 19/962 Part 2, TNA. 
46 Thatcher’s speech, September 22, 1982, MTF, Document no. 105022. 
47 Hong Kong to Beijing, no. 469, September 23, 1982, PREM 19/962 Part 2, TNA. 
48 Record of conversation, September 23, 1982, PREM 19/962 Part 2, TNA. 
49 Record of meeting, September 24, 1982, PREM 19/962 Part 2, TNA; Deng Xiaoping 
wenxuan, vol. 3 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), 12-15. 
50 Record of conversation, September 23, 1982, PREM 19/962 Part 2; Record of meeting, 
September 27, 1982, ibid., TNA. 
51 Record of meeting, September 26, 1982, MTF, Document no. 122625. 
52 Record of meeting, September 27, 1982, MTF, Document no. 122627. 
53 CC(82)42nd Conclusions, Minute 2, September 30, 1982, CAB 128/75, MTF, Document 
no. 123921. 
54 Cradock, Experiences of China, 182. 
55 See Brian Harrison, Finding a Role? The United Kingdom, 1970-1990 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 42-44. 
56 Robin Harris, Not for Turning: The Life of Margaret Thatcher (London: Bantam Press, 
2013), 222. 
57 Stephen Howe, “Decolonisation and Imperial Aftershocks: The Thatcher Years,” in 
Making Thatcher’s Britain, eds. Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 236-39 (quotation on 237). 
58 Harris, Not for Turning, 192; Richard Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain: The Politics and Social 
Upheaval of the 1980s (London: Pocket Books, 2010), 220. 
33 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
59 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 
1993), 259. 
60 John Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, vol. 2, The Iron Lady (London: Jonathan Cape, 
2003), 316, 318; Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain, 221; Harris, Not for Turning, 222. 
61 Aitken, Margaret Thatcher, 424. 
62 Robert Saunders, “‘Crisis? What Crisis?’ Thatcherism and the Seventies,” in Making 
Thatcher’s Britain, eds. Jackson and Saunders, 25-42.  
63 Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, 315. 
64 Deng never intended to bring “capitalism” to the “Special Economic Zones.” Deng 
Xiaoping nianpu, vol. 2, 1025-1026; Li Lanqing, Breaking Through: The Birth of China’s 
Opening-up Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 150-51. 
65 Annex I “Currency and Finance;” Annex L “Legal System on Hong Kong;” and Annex 
M “External Trade,” in “The Future of Hong Kong: A Special Study” by FCO, August 
1982, PREM 19/792, TNA.   
66  Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 262. 
67 Coles to Holmes, October 4, 1982, PREM 19/790 Part 2; Bone to Coles, October 11, 
1982, PREM 19/791 Part 3, TNA. 
68 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972 
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1992), 112-15. 
69 Deng Xiaoping nianpu, vol. 2, 812-13. 
70 Harding, A Fragile Relationship, 383-85. 
71 David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991), 265. 




                                                                                                                                                  
73 In early 1984 Cradock was appointed as the prime minister’s foreign policy advisor, 
while continuing to oversee the Hong Kong negotiations. 
74 Yun-Wing Sung, The China-Hong Kong Connection: The Key to China’s Open-Door 
Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
